https://mediawiki.middlebury.edu/IPE/index.php?title=Special:NewPages&feed=atom&hideredirs=1&limit=50&offset=&namespace=0&username=&tagfilter=&size-mode=max&size=0International Political Economy - New pages [en]2024-03-28T10:18:45ZFrom International Political EconomyMediaWiki 1.35.14https://mediawiki.middlebury.edu/IPE/Saltwater_and_Freshwater_EconomistsSaltwater and Freshwater Economists2010-11-30T14:11:52Z<p>Leah Pickett: New page: &nbsp;The “saltwater” and “freshwater” classification of economists arose to describe the general geographic locations of American scholars who ascribed to two schools of economic ...</p>
<hr />
<div>&nbsp;The “saltwater” and “freshwater” classification of economists arose to describe the general geographic locations of American scholars who ascribed to two schools of economic thought. Saltwater economists, generally found near the coasts, describes economists who see the need for active policy to fight recessions. Freshwater economists, often found in the Midwest and including the University of Chicago economists, are neoclassical economists who, at least before the financial meltdown, had complete faith in the power of the market. Freshwater economists are much less likely to ascribe to Keynesian ideas than are saltwater economists. However, many of the characteristics of these schools of thoughts may have changed in the aftermath of the financial crisis; most economists now realize that markets are imperfect.<br />
<ref>Krugman, Paul. “How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?” New York Times Magazine, September 2, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html.</ref></div>Leah Picketthttps://mediawiki.middlebury.edu/IPE/Factor_price_equalization_theoryFactor price equalization theory2010-11-30T13:53:09Z<p>Leah Pickett: New page: The factor price equalization theory is a theory that explains the effects of trade and globalization on the price of goods. The theory is often applied to workers’ wages. It predicts th...</p>
<hr />
<div>The factor price equalization theory is a theory that explains the effects of trade and globalization on the price of goods. The theory is often applied to workers’ wages. It predicts that trade will make less scarce the less-skilled workers in advanced countries and skilled workers in developed countries, therefore reducing their wages. Conversely, it will make more scarce unskilled workers in developing countries and skilled workers in developing countries, therefore raising their wages. The eventual outcome predicted by the theory is that equally skilled workers across countries will have equal wages. <br />
<br />
The factor price equalization theory has mixed results when applied to empirical cases. Although there have been rising wage gaps between skilled and unskilled workers in the United States, Freeman finds that, “Standard factor content analysis says that trade can account for 10-20% of the overall fall in demand for unskilled labor needed to explain rising wage differentials in the US.” <ref>Freeman, “Are Your Wages Set in Beijing.” International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. 4th ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000.</ref>However, unskilled workers in developing countries do appear to be seeing their wages rise in such cases as Asian sweatshops.</div>Leah Picketthttps://mediawiki.middlebury.edu/IPE/Religion_in_International_PoliticsReligion in International Politics2010-11-29T01:48:24Z<p>James Pates: New page: Religion has, and continues, to play a major role in dictating the way international politics plays out. Religion has the ability to supersede states and institutions in a way that few oth...</p>
<hr />
<div>Religion has, and continues, to play a major role in dictating the way international politics plays out. Religion has the ability to supersede states and institutions in a way that few other forces can. In particular, the continued spread of Radical Fundamentalism can have a major destabilizing effect on the international arena.<br />
<br />
Holy wars undertaking by radical fundamentalists raise international politics from a level of negotiated conflict to a war blessed by God. Jihadists have less to lose in instances of radicalism because of their belief that something better awaits them. This thus makes it more difficult for states to protect themselves.<br />
<br />
Fundamentalism is not connected to a specific state. Similarly, jihadists have no sense of obligation or loyalty to a state, and thus undermine the sense of international order that has become well established. They can thus not be stopped by standard methods since action taken by one state against another is irrelevant. Jihadists are not traying to protect the state, and thus deterrence is ineffective.<br />
<br />
Jihadi groups can demonstrate a type of soft power, and often change the behavior of other states. They spread their own believes and convince others to do their bidding. Technology in particular enhances these soft power resources. The news network Al Jazeera, for example, carries weight by choosing what to broadcast and what to avoid.</div>James Pateshttps://mediawiki.middlebury.edu/IPE/Nuclear_ProliferationNuclear Proliferation2010-11-29T01:41:36Z<p>James Pates: New page: Weapons of mass destruction, failed states, and nuclear proliferation combine to form one of the greatest threats to global security today. Each in their own right are dangerous, but when ...</p>
<hr />
<div>Weapons of mass destruction, failed states, and nuclear proliferation combine to form one of the greatest threats to global security today. Each in their own right are dangerous, but when taken together they represent an international political nightmare. Weapons of mass destruction are capable of ending life on Earth on their own. When taken with failed states that provide breeding grounds for terrorism, these weapons can easily proliferate into the wrong hands.<br />
<br />
'''Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons'''<br />
<br />
Proliferation of chemical and biological weapons cannot be ignored as a threat to international security. It is these deadly weapons that are often the cheapest, and thus are appealing to underfunded terrorist factions or rogue states without the budget for an intensive nuclear program. They are also extraordinarily indiscriminate, with the ability to wipe out massive segments of populations without regard to any standards of fair play in warfare. They are finally both hard to track and easy to transport, making them appealing for those working underground to collect and distribute such weapons.<br />
<br />
Nuclear weapons, none the less, can not be ignored as an appealing tool for wreaking havoc. Knowledge of how to produce nuclear weapons exists, and that knowledge can easily fall into the wrong hands. The world remains anarchic; a notion that appeals to states that have both immediate enemies and possess nuclear weapons such as India and Pakistan.<br />
<br />
'''The Threat of Failed States'''<br />
<br />
In a failed state, no one body has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. With that dearth of power comes a decline in law and order and national defense. There is an ensuing deficit in resolving inequality, enhancing social welfare, and improving economic performance. The result is a hotbed of instability, with problems like refugee flow creating danger for neighboring countries. Institutions are undermined, and power can be seized by unofficial groups not bound by the same rules that the rest of the international conglomerate play by. Terrorist networks provide an appealing alternative to the failed state, as they often provide support for those involved and a community of people who can identify with each other and rally against a cause. Without a state overseeing internal affairs, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction becomes much more of a reality, as flow of goods into and out of the states is largely unregulated. Failed states thus facilitate proliferation and hold the terrorist hotbeds most likely to use them.</div>James Pateshttps://mediawiki.middlebury.edu/IPE/US_Power_and_the_Construction_of_International_OrderUS Power and the Construction of International Order2010-11-29T01:27:46Z<p>James Pates: New page: For a long time, the US was extraordinarily reluctant to involve itself in international affairs. Even many of the founding fathers of the United States, most prominently George Washington...</p>
<hr />
<div>For a long time, the US was extraordinarily reluctant to involve itself in international affairs. Even many of the founding fathers of the United States, most prominently George Washington, warned against having intensive involvements in the international system. Through the beginning of the 21st century, however, the US has shrugged that notion to use it's preponderance of power to construct an international order. Two grand strategies work to explain this order: a realist paradigm and a neoliberal paradigm.<br />
<br />
'''Realist'''<br />
<br />
The relative peace that the world has known for the last few decades, as seen through the eyes of realist philosophy, is a tenuous one. Realism holds that containment and deterrents play a major role in this peace. The global balance of power has settled into a point of equilibrium. New variables like the potential for nuclear war make conflicts between states more and more irrational. All of these components yield a hard, long, bitter peace.<br />
<br />
The US has been at the forefront of many of these components. Institutions and partnerships, championed and grounded by the US, create order, which has value in maintaining the peace. Organizations like NATO provide venues for consultation, and agreements can be reached and differences can be resolved without conflict within these frameworks. US Statecraft and an effort to maintain the balance of power has helped keep the peace.<br />
<br />
'''Neoliberal'''<br />
<br />
In the neoliberal mind, institutional political relations in a broader construct of open economies has been the major motivating factor in a peaceful international system. These political relations have helped avoid a return to trade barriers and conflicts; hindrances to peace hearkening back to the 1930's. A focus on trade and international institutions has led to a rule based international order.<br />
<br />
Here, the US has used its power to promote congeniality. By helping to construct such institutions as the World Bank and the Bretton Woods system, a binding matrix of networked institutions has held firm and fast. This progressive vision of alliances and mutual self interest tempers the anarchical international framework that so often creates conflict.</div>James Pateshttps://mediawiki.middlebury.edu/IPE/Gini_coefficientGini coefficient2010-11-26T22:51:49Z<p>Agnes Hever: New page: The Gini coefficient is a measure of income distribution in a country. The Gini coefficient was developed by Italian statistician Corrado Gini in 1912. The Gini coefficient is a number bet...</p>
<hr />
<div>The Gini coefficient is a measure of income distribution in a country. The Gini coefficient was developed by Italian statistician Corrado Gini in 1912. The Gini coefficient is a number between 0 and 1. 0 expresses total equality, meaning if a country has an income of $100 and 10 people all of them earn $10. 1 expresses total inequality, when all the wealth of the country is in the hands of one person. In practice, the Gini coefficient is between 0.25 and 0.75 for all countries. Based on the Gini, in 2008, Namibia (0.74) was the least equal and Sweden (0.23) the most equal country in the world.</div>Agnes Heverhttps://mediawiki.middlebury.edu/IPE/Strange:_States,_Firms_and_DiplomacyStrange: States, Firms and Diplomacy2010-11-26T22:09:39Z<p>Agnes Hever: New page: In S''tates, Firms, and Diplomacy'' Susan Strange argues that multinational corporations are increasingly important in global political economy, in fact, they force states to adopt new for...</p>
<hr />
<div>In S''tates, Firms, and Diplomacy'' Susan Strange argues that multinational corporations are increasingly important in global political economy, in fact, they force states to adopt new forms of diplomacy. Recent changes in world politics internationalizing production allowed firms to take this new role in the international arena. Firms can now relocate their production because of technological development and cheaper transportation and communication costs. Firms can choose where to produce, and, as it is in the interest of states to attract multinational corporations, they gain political power. States do not only compete with other states for relative power, but also for market share. For this reason they must bargain with multinational corporations and convince them to locate their production in the state. Multinational corporations are likely to gain even more influence in the global economic system in the future.</div>Agnes Heverhttps://mediawiki.middlebury.edu/IPE/Odious_Rulers,_Odious_DebtOdious Rulers, Odious Debt2010-11-25T03:04:41Z<p>Kaitlynn Saldanha: </p>
<hr />
<div><br> In "Odious Rulers, Odious Debts" &nbsp;Stiglitz argues that debt forgiveness is in the international best interest (for both creditors and borrowers) and that an international structure for debt restructuring and relief is necessary. &nbsp;According to Stigliz, “Odious debts” are those incurred by a regime without political legitimacy, from creditors who “should have known better”. Such debt is often the product of oppression, where ironically, those oppressed end up being the ones asked to repay the debt. It is odious debt that will make debt relief in some states far from easy. In Iraq for instance, debt ranges from $60 billion to hundreds of billions, much of which are reparations imposed after the 1991 Gulf War from ammunition purchases and contracts signed under the corruption of Saddam Hussein. As Iraq attempts to rebuild in the wake of the current war, its financial legacy will make reconstruction difficult especially since any revenue it generates from oil purchases will go directly to international creditors. States such as France and Russia for instance, who are both owed large sums of money by Iraq, are not likely to pardon debt to rebuild an economy devastated by a war they opposed. Iraq is not alone when it comes to seemingly inescapable odious debts. Many states are in the same boat: Chie with debt from the Pinochet regime, South Africa from Apartheid, Argentina from the “dirty war” from 1976-1983, and Ethiopia from the Mengistu “Red Terror” regime. <br />
<br />
<br> <br />
<br />
In the wake of the formerly practiced strategy of invading a country with outstanding debt, in today’s global system, there is no procedure for the restructuring of government debts. Two years ago, the U.S. blocked an IMF initiative that would have bestowed the responsibility of the “bankruptcy judge” on the IMF. Today the United States continues to play to our best advantage, supporting debt forgiveness when other countries are owed money but arguing for full payments when our own money is at stake.<br> <br />
<br />
<br> <br />
<br />
Stiglitz highlights that debt forgiveness makes as much sense for creditors as it does for the borrowers, noting that nobody gained from Latin American indebtedness in the 1980’s. According to Stiglitz, the solution is an international “bankruptcy” court: a neutral player to deal with debt restructuring and relief. Loans would be determined odious or benign depending on their purpose and the validity of contracts made. Governments lending money to oppressive regimes would be notified that their loans are high risk. According to Stiglitz, in today’s globalized world, U.S. unilateralism has costs. If the U.S. wants the international community to work cooperatively to restructure Iraq’s economy, the U.S. must be willing to give something as well: perhaps commit itself to a framework for addressing debt relief, odious debts and restructuring<ref>stiglitz, Joseph E. “Odious Rulers, Odious Debts.” The Atlantic Monthly, September 10, 2003.</ref>. <br />
<br />
<br> <br />
<br />
References <br />
<br />
<references /><br></div>Kaitlynn Saldanha